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Re: [cobalt-users] regarding named running as root after pkg update...
- Subject: Re: [cobalt-users] regarding named running as root after pkg update...
- From: "Jonathan Michaelson" <michaelsonjd@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri Mar 23 07:32:53 2001
- List-id: Mailing list for users to share thoughts on Cobalt products. <cobalt-users.list.cobalt.com>
Glen,
> What problems could occur if named continues running as root?
The problem, as I understand it, is when issues as has happened recently
with the BIND exploit come to light. that is, when someone exploits a
service with a buffer overflow and the server dumps you at the shell prompt
with the privileges of the user that the process was running under, in this
case root. That's why the recent problem with BIND was/is so devastating,
you have instant access to the server as the root account.
However, one way to combat this is to run the server under a less-privileged
user, in the case named, so that should a future exploit be found, you would
be _less_ vulnerable to further damage arising from the dumping of your
hacker at the shell prompt. Of course, they could still have shell access,
but at least they're not running with root privileges.
I may be wrong with this (and I'm sure I'll be corrected) but this is my
understanding of the benefit of running BIND under a user other than that of
root.
Regards,
Jonathan Michaelson
Commercial Perl CGI Scripting
Cobalt RaQ Support Services