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[cobalt-users] Re: Removing ~ for website URL
- Subject: [cobalt-users] Re: Removing ~ for website URL
- From: Bruce Timberlake <bruce@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon Apr 19 09:31:02 2004
- Organization: BRTNet.org
- List-id: Mailing list for users to share thoughts on Sun Cobalt products. <cobalt-users.list.cobalt.com>
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As others have replied, check /etc/httpd/conf/access.conf for the
FollowSymlinks directive. Here's the relevant chunk from my own RaQ 4:
<Directory /home/sites/>
# This may also be "None", "All", or any combination of "Indexes",
# "Includes", "FollowSymLinks", "ExecCGI", or "MultiViews".
# Note that "MultiViews" must be named *explicitly* --- "Options All"
# doesn't give it to you.
Options Indexes FollowSymLinks Includes MultiViews
and then a little later in the file:
# be more restrictive within a site
<Directory /home/sites/*/>
Options -FollowSymLinks +SymLinksIfOwnerMatch
</Directory>
A caveat from the Apache Definitive Guide
(http://www.hk8.org/old_web/linux/apache/ch03_11.htm) - I don't know how
CGIWrap plays into this; you might be safe anway because of it:
However, there are security problems to do with other users on the same
system. Imagine that one of them is a dubious character called Fred, who has
his own webspace, .../fred/public_html. Imagine that the webmaster has a CGI
script called fido that lives in .../cgi-bin and belongs to webuser. If the
webmaster is wise, she has restricted read and execute permissions for this
file to its owner and no one else. This, of course, allows web clients to use
it because they also appear as webuser. As things stand, Fred cannot read the
file. This is fine, and in line with our security policy of not letting
anyone read CGI scripts. This denies them knowledge of any security holes.
Fred now sneakily makes a symbolic link to fido from his own webspace. In
itself, this gets him nowhere. The file is as unreadable via symlink as it is
in person. But if Fred now logs on to the Web (which he is perfectly entitled
to do), accesses his own webspace and then the symlink to fido, he can read
it because he now appears to the operating system as webuser.
The Options command without All or FollowSymLinks stops this caper dead. The
more trusting webmaster may be willing to concede FollowSymLinks-IfOwnerMatch
since that too should prevent access.
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